One line of cases, exemplified by a series of recent decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, has held that there is no contractual relationship whatever between an enlistee and the armed services; instead, enlistment effects a status, the rights and duties of which are defined by statutes and regulations and to which the laws of contract are inapplicable. 15 Federal district and appellate courts, however, continue to cite Grimley for the proposition that " [i] t is settled that enlistment in the military service establishes a contractual relationship."' 6 Some of the Court's statements in Grimley seem to support this proposition, but it is clear that Grimley's holding represents, at the very least, a rejection of the use of contract principles to resolve problems concerning matters governed by statute.
The difficulties involved in characterizing the relationship between the armed services and enlistees as contractual are suggested by examining an ordinary enlistment.' 7 The documents normally used t6 effect such an enlistment are virtually devoid of provisions that can be considered contractual terms. The Form 4 enlistment contract 18 17 For the purposes of this comment, ordinary enlistment refers to enlistment without guarantees of special training or assignment. See note 122 inlra.
18 Dep't of Defense (DD) Form 4, Enlistment Contract-Armed Forces of the United States (Feb. 1, 1970) [hereinafter cited as DD Form 4]. The first part of this two-page standard government form consists of forty-nine spaces for recording personal data and is designed for use in processing inductees as well as enlistees. MCO P.1100.61C, supra note 1, para. 2351(1)(c); NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art. B-22402(1). The remainder of the document contains the oath of enlistment (items 57, 58), the witnessing officer's confirmation of enlistment (item 59), two provisions that quote statutes applicable only to the Navy (items 51, 52), a provision that paraphrases statutes applicable only to reserve components (item 53), and the following provisions:
50. I know that if I secure my enlistment by means of any false statement, willful misrepresentation or concealment as to my qualifications for enlistment, I am liable to trial by court martial or discharge for fraudulent enlistment and that, if rejected because of any disqualification known and concealed by me, I will not be furnished return transportation to place of acceptance.
I am of legal age to enlist. I have never deserted from and I am not a member the other documents used for an ordinary Army enlistment, 19 for example, consist almost entirely of disclaimers 20 and of spaces for recording personal data concerning the enlistee. 21 The terms of any supposed contract must, therefore, be found in the statutes and military regulations governing enlisted members of the armed forces.
It is, perhaps, possible to characterize a relationship of this sortone that, although voluntarily entered into, is governed entirely by statutes and regulations-as, in some sense, contractual. 22 The Court in Grimley seems to have recognized, however, that there is some danger in doing this, that simply because enlistment can be considered a species of contract, it does not necessarily follow that disputes involving enlistment should be resolved according to the principles of the general theory of contracts. 23 The rules of the general theory, as set of the Armed Forces of the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard or any Reserve component thereof; I have never been discharged from the Armed Forces or any type of civilian employment in the United States or any other country on account of disability or through sentence of either civilian or military court unless so indicated by me in item 56, "Remarks" of this contract. I am not now drawing retired pay, a pension, disability allowance, or disability compensation from the government of the United States. 54. I have had this contract fully explained to me, I understand it, and certify that no promise of any kind has been made to me concerning assignment to duty, geographical area, schooling, special programs, assignment of government quarters, or transportation of dependents except as indicated 55. I swear (or affirm) that the foregoing statements have been read to me, that my statements have been correctly recorded and are true in all respects and that I fully understand the conditions under which I am enlisting. 11) AR 601-210, supra note 2, para. 6-4 to 6-8, requires that in addition to Form 4, male enlistees sign the following documents: Department of Defense (DD) Form 98, Armed Forces Security Questionnaire; Department of Defense (DD) Form 398, Statement of Personal History; Department of the Army (DA) Form 3286, Statements for Enlistment, pts. II & I (all of which are records of personal data); and Department of the Army (DA) Form 3286, pt. III (which consists entirely of disclaimers and provisions pertaining only to special programs). 20 E.g., DD Form 4, supra note 18, item 54; Dep't of the Army (DA) Form 3286, Statements for Enlistment, pL I, item la: "All promises made to me are contained in items 3 .. 37 . . . 48 . . . of the DD Form 4, my Enlistment Contract." 21 The armed forces' recourse against an enlistee who supplies false personal data is not a contract action, but a court martial action for fraudulent enlistment. 10 U.S.C. § 883 (1970). 22 See, e.g., Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 397, 411 (1933) , which points out that the word "contract" has been used "to embrace all forms of legal obligation, or alteration of legal relations, grounded on manifestation of consent." See also Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 103, 111 (1970) .
23 One commentator has observed that "the conception of 'contract' is stretched to micrometer thickness" when it is applied to so-called compulsory contracts, such as insurance contracts in which substantially all the terms are prescribed by law. Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. Rev. 731, 743 (1943) . That there are limits to this stretching process, at least in terms of utility, is suggested by the efforts of courts and commentators to remove such status-saturated contracts as insurance policies, The Supreme Court has consistently rejected contract principles as an aid in resolving problems involving statutory requirements. In a companion case to Grimley, In re Morrissey, 28 the Court held that the validity of the enlistment of a minor "depends wholly upon the legislature" 29 and is unaffected by common law contract principles. 3 26 See Summers, supra note 23, at 566-67. Professor Summers argues: "If the 'law of contracts' is to be conceived as encompassing all contractual transactions, it must not be conceptualized as a single body of law but as a family of bodies of law, interrelated but each distinctive." Id. at 567. The members of the family would include the law of insurance contracts, partnership agreements, collective agreements, and among others, the "general theory of contract" presented in the treatises and the Restatement. The last member, he suggests, "is not a parent body of law but rather just another portion of the multifaceted law of contractual transactions." Id. (Pa. 1824) . At least one court followed the rule to the conclusion that a minor who enlisted in the armed forces and committed a military offense could avoid his contract and thereby escape the jurisdiction of a court martial. Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 67 (1814) .
Half a century after Morrissey the Court of Military Appeals, provoked by the persistence of counsel in arguing contract theory in cases involving the enlistment of minors, reemphasized that: "[Although an] agreement to enlist in an armed service is often referred to as a contract. . . . [w] hat is really created is a status. . . . As a result, no useful purpose is served by reviewing the common-law rules of contract and whether the contract of a minor is, under the common law, voidable at his election. ... We must . . . [instead] crued pay and allowances even though they had "behaved with utter disloyalty" while interned in a North Korean prison camp. 8 2 It rejected the government's argument that the soldiers could recover nothing because their behavior constituted a material breach of their enlistment contracts. 3 Despite these decisions by the Supreme Court, however, federal district and appellate courts have continued to employ contract rules to resolve problems concerning the statutes and regulations defining enlistees' rights and obligations, the constitutional rights of enlistees, and the procedures by which enlistment may be effected.
A. Statutes and Regulations
The case of Wallace v. Chafee illustrates the courts' use of contract principles to resolve essentially statutory questions. In Wallace, a Marine Corps reservist on inactive duty training was convicted by a summary court martial of having wilfully disobeyed the orders of a superior commissioned officer. The reservist sought relief on the ground that the court martial lacked jurisdiction over him. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that court martial jurisdiction extends to members of reserve units on inactive duty training only if they have voluntarily accepted written orders specifying that they are subject to the Code. 3 5 The district court 6 agreed with Wallace that his acceptance of such orders had not been voluntary within the meaning of the statute. The court argued that the acceptance of court martial jurisdiction is a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights of civilian criminal justice and that, in order to be valid, it must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." 3 7 The court found that the procedure by which Wallace accepted the orders reduced any element of choice "to its minimum dimensions": 38 the orders had been presented to him in the midst of "a sea of forms," and he had been given no information concerning the Code or the consequences of his acceptance. 89 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's opinion that acceptance of court martial orders constitutes a waiver of fundamental rights and that the wording of the statute seemed to indicate "that Congress may have desired a truly voluntarily acceptance." 40 Nonetheless, the circuit court reversed. It concluded that since a reservist accepts the orders "only as part of the contractual transaction of enlistment," it is sufficient if "the contract law standards of notice and volitional act are met." 41 The court continued: "One who enters a contract is on notice of the provisions of the contract. If he assents voluntarily to those provisions after notice, he should be presumed, in the absence of ambiguity, to have understood and agreed to comply with the provisions as written. This is hornbook contract law."42
The Ninth Circuit thus argued that the orders by which reservists are subjected to court marital jurisdiction constitute contracts and that, since Wallace had signed the orders, he must, according to contract law, be presumed to have understood them. It is difficult, however, to see why acceptance of the orders should be considered the making of a contract. The matter is governed by the statutory provision of the Uniform Code requiring voluntary acceptance, and this provision should, like all statutes, be construed to accord with constitutional requirements, without reference to the principles of contract law.
Contract principles have also been used to dispose of due process challenges to the procedures by which reservists are ordered to active duty for unsatisfactory participation in their reserve units. 43 In Ansted v. Resor, 44 the reservist claimed that his activation was unconstitutional because he had not been accorded a hearing. The court responded that the statutes and regulations did not require a hearing and that the reservist had contractually agreed to be subject to the procedures that they set forth. 45 Rxv. 127, 146 (1964) . 49 The courts have generally acknowledged that the individual interests affected by activation are substantial. E.g., O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 , 1089 (3d Cir. 1971 . In Ansted and Mickey, petitioners were separated from their homes and employment for seventeen and sixteen months respectively, and were subjected to a significant loss of liberty and forfeiture of constitutional rights for those periods. See notes 95-96 infra. 50 In Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1970) , cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970) , the court implied that the "contract agreement" could "waive . . . procedural rights which might have otherwise existed without it." 51 An analogous problem, involving the procedures necessary to terminate an enlistment, was created by an opinion of the Attorney General which held that since an enlistment was a "contract ... for a specific tern of service ... ," it automatically ended when the term of enlistment expired, thus implying that an enlistee who simply de- Among the consequences of this application of contract rules is the doctrine of constructive enlistment. For example, in a 1918 opinion the Army Judge Advocate General argued that "since an enlistment is the act of making a contract to voluntarily serve the Government as a soldier," it follows "logically that an enlistment contract can be implied as well as expressed"; therefore, the Judge Advocate concluded, an enlistment can be effected by the receipt of military pay or other benefits. 5 2 The Judge Advocate's opinion, and the doctrine of constructive enlistment that it expressed, is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Grimley that enlistment must be effected by formal oath. 5 3 The requirement of a formal oath " may serve a cautionary function, 5 deterring ill-considered or accidental enlistments-a function of particular importance in view of the serious consequences that enlistment may have, including loss of liberty and forfeiture of certain constitutional rights. Despite these considerations, the doctrine of constructive enlistment has persisted. 58 The rules of contract have also been employed in cases concerning misconduct or misrepresentation by military recruiters. In Ex parte Blackington, 57 for example, the court found that the recruiter had been 52 1918 Op. JAG 488 (1918). A civilian present at the National Guard Armory when the regiment was mobilized was "ordered to fall in." He obeyed the order, trained and served with the regiment for a year, and then applied for a discharge on the ground that he was not legally in the service because he had neither enlisted nor been inducted. The discharge was denied on the ground that the civilian had effected an implied enlistment by receiving pay and by rendering military service.
53 137 U.S. 147, 156 (1890). One issue in Grimley was "whether petitioner had, in fact, enlisted." Id. at 155. Immediately after he took the oath of enlistment from the recruiter, petitioner departed; he was arrested three months later as a deserter. The Court noted that article 47 of the Articles of War subjected to court martial jurisdiction "[a]ny . . . soldier who, having received pay, or having been duly enlisted . . . deserts . . .." Id. at 156. Since Grimley had not received pay, it was necessary for the Court to determine what constituted an enlistment. Although the Court recognized that Grimley could have been court martialed if he had received pay, it did not suggest that the receipt of pay could constitute an enlistment. Since the receipt-of-pay clause was later eliminated from the desertion article, Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, art. 58, 39 Stat. 660, there is presently no basis whatever for the notion that the receipt of pay subjects a person to court martial jurisdiction. 54 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970), requires that every enlistee take an oath but is silent as to whether taking the oath is sufficient or necessary to effect an enlistment. 10 U.S.C. § 1031 (1970), however, implies that the oath is "required" to effect an enlistment.
55 See the discussion of "The Functions Performed by Legal Formalities" in Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLtrm. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941) . [39:783
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"actuated by bias and hostility"; 58 he had enlisted the petitioner in the heavy artillery even though he had discovered that the petitioner suffered from a physical infirmity which would render duty near cannons hazardous. The court, nonetheless, dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It held that, although the recruiter might be accountable to his superiors for enlisting a person unfit for service, he had no obligation to the petitioner to determine fairly his fitness for artillery duty. The court explained that enlistment "rests on a contract between the recruit and the government" based on the recruit's offer of service and its acceptance by military authorities. In making this contract, the court stated, "the parties deal at arm's length; neither occupies a fiduciary position towards the other; each looks out for his (or its) own interest."
59
In several recent cases in which enlistees have sought discharge on the ground that their enlistments were induced by misrepresentation, the courts' tendency to frame enlistment in contract terms has had two important consequences. First, courts have held applicable to such cases the principle of government contract law that agents of the United States cannot bind it contractually except within the scope of their actual authority. And second, they have assumed that the disclaimers in Department of Defense Form 4 are contractual provisions and must be construed according to orthodox contract principles.
In Gausmann v. Clifford, 60 for example, an enlistee alleged that the recruiter had induced him to enlist by representing that upon enlistment in the Army's Europe Option 0 ' he would be assigned to Europe for four years. The enlistee claimed that the Army had breached its contract by reassigning him to Viet Nam after only one year in Europe. The district court ignored the question whether the recruiter had made the alleged representations. Cir. 1971) , in which the court assumed that since the court martial orders were presented to the reservist at the time he enlisted, the standard of voluntariness applicable to his acceptance of the orders was the same arm's length bargaining contract standard applicable to the rest of the enlistment procedure.
60 Civil No. 49769 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 1969 ), aff'd. sub nom., Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969 ).
61
The particular cases discussed in this section involve enlistees in the specialized enlistment programs discussed at note 122 infra, but the present discussion is applicable to all types of enlistment.
62 Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the district court's determination "that no such guarantee as petitioner now claims was given," Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394, 395, the district court found only that the Army had made no such guarantee, not that the recruiter had made no verbal guarantee, Gausmann v. 
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documents and concluded that, since they contained no such guarantees, no relief was available. 63 Because the petitioner in Gausmann framed the issue in terms of contractual breach, he could not prevail without a showing that the recruiter's representations were contractual terms, a result precluded by three orthodox contract principles: (1) such representations are not binding on the Army because the recruiter lacked authority to make them; 64 (2) provisions in the documents that disclaim verbal promises 65 must be enforced like other contractual provisions; 6 6 and (3) such oral representations are inadmissible parol evidence.
67
Since he did not seek to enforce his enlistment contract by specific performance or damages, but merely sought discharge from the Army, the enlistee in Gausmann could simply have sought annulment of his enlistment on the ground that it had been induced by misrepresentation. This theory of the case could have been advanced whether or not enlistment is viewed as a contract 8 and would have rendered the actual authority and parol evidence rules irrelevant. This approach was taken by the enlistee in Shelton v. Brunson. 6 9 In that case, the enlistee alleged that he had been induced to reenlist by representations that he 68 If enlistment is viewed as a contract, an action can be brought to avoid it. Shelton v. Brunson, No. 7g-1042 , at 7-8 (5th Cir., Aug. 17, 1972 met the physical requirements for an officer training program. Midway through the program, however, he was dismissed from it because he did not, in fact, meet those requirements, and he was reassigned to Iceland. The enlistee sought discharge on the ground that his enlistment had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentations. 70 The district court denied relief,71 and the Fifth Circuit, in turn, denied a stay of the order transferring the enlistee to Iceland.7 2 The district court relied on both the actual authority doctrine and on the disclaimer contained in item 54 of Form 4, which states that "no promise of any kind has been made to me concerning assignment to duty, geographical area, schooling, [or] special programs . . ,, 7 The court, applying ordinary contract principles, considered this provision conclusive evidence that the enlistee had not relied on any oral representations.
As Judge Wisdom argued in his forceful dissent to the Fifth Circuit's decision denying a stay, the district court's reliance on these contract doctrines was misplaced. First, the fact "that the recruiters lacked actual authority to bind the Air Force [was] irrelevant." Since the enlistee was seeking to avoid the enlistment on the ground of misrepresentation, "[t]he question [was] ... one of apparent authority: whether it was reasonable for Shelton to conclude that the recruiters had the authority to bind the Air Force which their very function, and apparently their own words, suggested they would have." 74 Second, Judge Wisdom argued that if contract principles were to be applied, they should be those applicable to contracts of adhesion. 5 In enlistment, as in transactions that have been characterized as adhesion contracts 7 standardized forms prepared by one party are presented to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and one of the parties is in exclusive control of important information concerning the subject matter 70 See Wong v. Laird, 4 S.S.L.R. 3650 (N.D. Cal. 1971), which granted such relief. The court found that the petitioner had been induced to enlist in the Army by a recruiter's representation that he would be assigned to duty as a stenographer. The court ordered that if petitioner was not assigned duty as a stenographer within twelve days, a writ of habeas corpus would be granted requiring that he be discharged. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review (1970) . For a discussion of the principles of construction applied to the insurance contract, an adhesion contract characterized by gross inequality of information between the parties, see Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 305-07, 208 A.2d 638, 644-45 (1965) .
78 See Scepansky, The Techniques of Modern Recruiting, 19 AIR U. REv. 73, 76-77 (1968) . The author, a brigadier general in the Headquarters of the Air Force Recruiting Service, states: "All would-be recruiters are introduced to the techniques of recruiting and interviewing in an eight-week Recruiter Training Course at Lackland AFB, Texas. . . . The students learn enough fundamental psychology so they can probe into a prospect's basic interests, desires, and ambitions. Once these are established, the recruiter learns to concentrate on those aspects of an Air Force career which would most appeal to the prospect-education, job satisfaction, security, etc. He discovers how to establish empathy with the prospect and overcome objections, and he acquires an intuitive sense of when to close the sale." Serious charges concerning hard-sell tactics of over-zealous recruiters are made in P. BANFs, PAWNS, Tim PLiG-T OF THE CmiZEN-SomER 33-58 (1972) them."' Although the Fifth Circuit had refused to grant a stay of Shelton's transfer order, it recently vacated the district court's decision in Shelton and remanded the case for further proceedings. 8 2 The court relied on a subjective theory of contract closely akin to adhesion principles. 3 It agreed with Judge Wisdom that the disclaimer was ambiguous in its application to Shelton's medical qualifications for a commission and held that the disclaimer would not be effective unless both Shelton and the Air Force intended it to cover this question. The court held that if either Shelton or the Air Force did not so intend and if Shelton could establish that the alleged misrepresentations had been made, then Shelton was, as a matter of law, entitled to avoid the enlistment contract.
Even in the absence of ambiguity, however, the enforceability of the disclaimer is open to question. The courts have often refused to give effect to such clauses in adhesion documents when they are not conspicuous and prominently placed. 4 Although item 54 is not in smaller print than the rest of the document-unlike the famous disclaimer in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.SS--it is at the bottom of a dozen sentences of fine print and is unemphasized. Moreover, the prominence of item 54 must be judged in the context of the entire enlistment procedure. 8 6 Under this approach, the disclaimer may be used as some evidence that the enlistee did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations, even though it cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of nonreliance. This approach may, therefore, be more realistic than those suggested in Judge Wisdom's dissent and in the Fifth Cir-81 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972).
82 No. 72-1042 (5th Cir., Aug. 17, 1972 . 83 A purely objective approach "is blind to details of subject matter and person," L. FRmDMAN, supra note 23, at 20; if the individual has signed the document he is bound by its contents, REsrATEMENT oF CONTRACrs § 70 (1932) . A purely subjective approach is concerned with the actual intent of the parties, whereas an adhesion approach is concerned with the reasonable intent of some category of persons in some category of circumstances. See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HAnv. L. Rav. 529, 539-44 (1971) .
84 See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 298, 225 A.2d 328, 331-32 (1966); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 395-405, 161 A.2d 69, 90-94 (1960) . 85 32 N.J. 358, 866, 161 A.2d 69, 73 (1960) . 86 See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 46 (1951) , in which the Court held that the effect to be given a footnote in a standard government form was to be determined by reference to the "total setting" in which the document was signed. Id. It is interesting to speculate whether the Court would have reached the same result in Moser if it had viewed the document as a contract; and it is, perhaps, useful to inquire whether there is any more reason to regard Form 4 as a contract than the form which petitioner in Moser signed.
The University of Chicago Law Review [39:783 cuit's opinion. 7 Under Judge Wisdom's approach, the ambiguous disclaimer is construed to be inapplicable to the misrepresentations; under the Fifth Circuit's, the disclaimer is inapplicable if the enlistee did not intend it to apply. Thus, under neither approach could the disclaimer be taken as evidence-however inconclusive-of nonreliance.
Another perspective on the misrepresentation problem can be obtained by abandoning the contract concept entirely and by viewing enlistment, not as the making of a contract, but simply as an administrative procedure by which persons enter the armed forces. s 8 Viewed in this way, analogies can be drawn from cases involving induction, the alternative method of entering the armed services. The courts have held that an inductee must be discharged from the armed services if his induction was precipitated by a prejudicial violation of Selective Service regulations. 8 9 Since the armed services, as well as the Selective Service System, are required to follow their own regulations, 0 and since some of the services have issued regulations that prohibit recruiters from making misrepresentations to enlistees, 91 enlistees should be afforded similar relief. Moreover, recent decisions have held that even in the absence of such regulations, the Selective Service System has an Riv. 629, 635 (1943) .
88 Under this approach, as under the direct contract of adhesion approach, see text at note 84 supra, disclaimers such as item 54 are merely some evidence that the enlistee did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations.
89 E.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 235, 246-48 (1968) Vt. 1972) . The principle that administrative action in violation of regulations can constitute a denial of due process has been limited to military regulations developed for the "protection" or "benefit" of servicemen, as opposed to regulations designed simply to promote the efficient functioning of the military establishment. Silverthorne v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1175 , 1186 (5th Cir. 1972 Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1971) . But see Clark v. Brown, 414 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969 .
91 E.g., ATCM 33-2, supra note 2, para. 1-6 (emphasis in original): "Recruiting personnel will not make promises to applicants, except as authorized by this or other Air Force Directives ....
A single instance of misrepresentation, deception or other omission of vital facts when information is given the applicant by recruiting personnel will not be condoned." See also NAVPERS 15838A, supra note I, art., 8-1114; AR 601-210, supra note 2. It is difficult to understand the purpose of such regulations if they are not for the protection of enlistees. See note 90 supra. affirmative duty to give clear and correct information and advice when requested to do so; 92 and that an inductee prejudiced by erroneous information given him by Selective Service personnel must be discharged. 3 This principle has been applied even when the Selective Service employee had neither authority to dispense information nor an intention to mislead the inductee. 94 The inquiry is simply whether the inductee relied to his detriment on the erroneous representation. Since both enlistment and induction result in an identical loss of liberty 95 and forfeiture of constitutional rights, 9 6 and both inductee and enlistee require information in order to make important decisions, 97 the stan- Rav. 1038 Rav. , 1252 Rav. -59 (1970 . The enlistee also suffers a curtailment of first amendment rights. 75 (1947) , the restraints imposed on the enlistees are unique because they are irrevocable. 97 The enlistee must decide whether to take the oath of enlistment (which is necessary to effect an enlistment, see note 53 supra). The inductee must decide whether to apply for certain deferments and to make certain appeals, see, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 442 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1971), and whether to take the step forward in the induction ceremony, which is necessary to effect induction, Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 559 (1943);
The University of Chicago Law Review [39:783 dard applied in Selective Service cases should also be applied in cases concerning enlistment.
II. ENLISTMENT AS A SOURCE OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
Because of their tendency to view enlistment as a contract, the courts have assumed that enlistees have certain contractual rights, of which they cannot be deprived without due process of law. Although most of the courts have grounded such rights on specific written provisions in enlistment documents, a few courts have held that, even in the absence of such provisions, statutes governing enlistees are a source of contractual rights and that the power of Congress to alter such rights by statutory amendment is restricted by the fifth amendmentY 9 However, if the term "contract" is to have any meaning at all, an enlistee's contractual lights must be based on specific representations Army Reg. (AR) 601-270, Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, para. 3-22, (Mar. 18, 1969 , change no. 3, Apr. 19, 1971 .
98 Analogies can also be drawn from standards of nonmisrepresentation and disclosure required in other governmental procedures which impose a loss of liberty and forfeiture of constitutional rights, such as criminal trial. See notes 95-96 infra. But see Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374 , 1377 (9th Cir. 1971 , discussed at notes 40-50 supra, in which the court distinguished enlistment from criminal trial on the ground that, whereas the criminal defendant has the court procedure "thrust upon him," the enlistee's entry into the armed forces is "purely volitional." Although that distinction could also be drawn between enlistment and induction, it is formalistic because both procedures have identical consequences. A distinction that could be drawn between enlistment and criminal trial is simply that the latter results in a more complete deprivation of liberty and constitutional rights, and, for that reason, more stringent safeguards may be necessary to ensure that the criminal defendant is informed of his rights. 1052 (1968) , 113 members of an Army reserve unit activated by the President during the Pueblo incident sought an injunction preventing the activation on the ground that it was in violation of their enlistment contracts. At the time the reservists enlisted, a statute provided that reserve units could be activated by the President only "in time of national emergency declared by the President." Subsequently Congress amended the statute to provide that reserve units could also be activated by the President "when he deems it necessary." The reservists contended that presidential activation pursuant to the amendment without a declaration of national emergency constituted a contractual breach. The documents that the reservists signed at the time of their enlistments contained no provision specifying the circumstances under which reserve units could be activated by the President, but the district court assumed that enlistment established a contractual relation and held that "the provisions of statutory law existing when each petitioner . . . made to him at the time of his enlistment10° As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Morse v. Boswell, the mere existence of a statute is no more a source of contractual rights for an enlistee than it is for any other citizen: "[I]t is within the power of Congress to change existing law and no type of estoppel interferes with its lawmaking power.... The disappointment realized by those who relied only on general law but did not have that explicit promise from their government in contract form is disappointment of a kind shared by all citizens in a society of shifting law."' 01 Even when it is claimed that specific provisions in enlistment documents are sources of contractual rights it is necessary to examine the particular provisions and the reasons for regarding them as contractual. At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between two types of provisions: first, those that paraphrase statutes, such as certain provisions in the reserve component statements of understanding; 1 0 2 and second, it is based either upon the parties' actual intent and expectations concerning future events (the subjective or meeting-of-the-minds approach, see, e.g., T. PARSONS, supra note 5), or upon a reasonable interpretation of the external manifestations of their intent and expectations, that is, of their acts and words (the objective approach, see, e.g., 0. HOLMES, TlE COaMON LAw 309 (1881); 1 S. WiusrON, supra note 25, § 95). Since enlistment is a transaction between the enlistee and agents of the armed forces, an enlistee's contractual rights must be based upon those agents' written or verbal representations.
The mere existence of a statute is not a source of contractual rights because statutory provisions do not, in and of themselves, constitute promises concerning the legislature's future actions. See Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 387 (1903). A statute can be considered a source of contractual rights only if it is expressly or implicitly adopted by the parties as a contractual term. Williston attacked the judicial practice of treating a statute as an implied contractual term merely because it was in existence at the inception of the contract: "Doubtless, law frequently is adopted by the parties as a portion of their agreement. Whether it is or not in any particular case should be determined by the same standard of interpretation as is applied to their expressions in other respects." 4 S. WmLLrON, supra note 25, § 615, at 614. The results of that practice can sometimes be justified on policy grounds, see Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73, 1081 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1970), but they cannot be justified by the policies supporting the enforcement of contracts, see text at notes 130-31. The analysis in such cases could be clarified by separating the contractual and the statutory elements of complex legal relationships.those found in documents used for special enlistment programs, 1 0 3 which concern matters governed by military regulation and constitute promises made to induce enlistment.
A. Reserve Component Statements of Understanding
Most courts have considered the statement of understanding a source of contractual rights. 104 This conclusion appears to be based on a general assumption that all documents the enlistee signs are necessarily contracts rather than on any appraisal of the intent and effects of the provisions. For example in Pfile v. Corcoran, 10 5 an enlistee in the Army Reserve signed, in addition to Form 4, a statement of understanding which provided: "If in any year I fail to perform satisfactorily any of the requirements set forth above, I can be ordered to perform active duty for training for a maximum of 45 days or be reported to selective service for immediate induction."' 1 6 This provision paraphrased statutes in effect when the document was signed, which Congress later amended to increase the maximum period of activation to two years. When the enlistee was subsequently activated for seventeen months, he sought release from active duty on the ground that the activation violated the terms of his enlistment contract. The district court held that the document was a contract and that it had been breached by the activation; nonetheless, it concluded that the breach was justified as an exercise of Congress's war power.
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Because the court assumed that enlistment necessarily creates a contractual relationship 0 9 and, therefore, began its analysis by searching for the contract's terms," 0 it rejected the Army's contention that the statement of understanding "does not purport to be any sort of contract or commitment, and has no legal effect other than to indicate that the enlistee is aware of the applicable law at the time of enlistment.""' [39:783
There are at least two reasons why the Army's contention should have been accepted. First, it is doubtful that Congress has authorized the armed services to enter into contracts regarding subjects governed by statute. The Supreme Court has suggested that in determing whether a statute is the source of contractual rights, "it is of first importance to examine the language of the statute" to see whether it "provides for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the state .... 1112 It is difficult, however, to find language in the statutory provisions governing enlistees that can be construed in this way. 113 Indeed, it is questionable that Congress has authorized the armed services to enter into contracts with enlistees regarding any subject. 11 4 Even if such authorization can be implied from statutory provisions delegating broad powers to the secretaries of the armed forces 1 5 and authorizing them to conduct intensive recruiting campaigns," 8 it is doubtful that Congress intended to restrict its freedom to amend statutes by authorizing the services to make binding commitments to enlistees concerning statutory subjects." 7 Second, contractual guarantees concerning subjects governed by statute are superfluous so long as the statute remains in force, 1 8 and, as the Pfile court's invocation "active duty agreements" by which members of reserve components serve on active duty for extended periods, and 10 U.S.C. § § 4348, 6959, 9348 (1970) , which require cadets at the service academies to sign "agreements." "14 With the exception of 32 U.S.C. § 304 (1970) , which provides that "[e]ach person enlisting in the National Guard shall sign an enlistment contract . . .," no statutory provision expressly refers to "enlistment contracts." Although there are significant differences between enlistment in the National Guard and in other reserve components, see Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060 , 1063 (5th Cir. 1969 , it is difficult to understand why enlistment in the National Guard should create a contractual relationship if enlistment in other reserve components does not.
115 E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3012 (1970) . 116 Id. § 503.
of the war power indicates, virtually worthless as soon as the statute is amended.
One factor, however, militates in favor of treating as contractual the statute-paraphrasing provisions of the reserve component statements of understanding. The documents and provisions are at present so ambiguous that a potential enlistee may be induced to enlist by statements that, he could reasonably believe, limit his reserve obligation." 19 Since the armed forces almost certainly do not intend such provisions to be contractual commitments,' 120 the problem could be solved most expeditiously by redrafting the documents to make that fact clear.'
B. Special Enlistment Programs
The courts have also assumed that when a person enlists in one of the armed services' special enlistment programs, 22 the provisions in his enlistment documents concerning the special training and duty assignments he is to receive' 23 are contractual. 24 Unlike the provisions 119 That such a belief would be reasonable is indicated by the fact that during the flood of litigation that followed the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1970), more than two 879 (2d Cir. 1968 879 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968 .
121 A clause similar to the following could be added: "The statements in this document are not promises or guarantees of any kind; they merely explain the present law, which is subject to change at any time by Act of Congress."
122 These special enlistment programs include the Army's Europe Option, AR 601-210, supra note 2, table 5-8 (change no. 5, Jan. 26, 1970), and Language School Option, id., 127 and mass media advertising. 28 In addition, they concern matters such as training and assignment of enlistees that are not governed by statute and that Congress has committed to military discretion.
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Although these provisions cannot be viewed as terms in an otherwise contractual relationship, there is a sound reason for the position that these provisions, in themselves, constitute a contract between the enlistee and the government: it is necessary that some remedy be afforded when special program guarantees are breached, and contractual concepts are useful in framing an appropriate remedy.
The Need for Enforcement.
Perhaps the central reason for providing a legal remedy for breach of promise is to encourage voluntary reliance on the kinds of promises that benefit society as a whole. 8 0 Thus, for example, promotion of reliance on private commercial promises is necessary in an economic system that depends largely on free exchange rather than governmental compulsion for the distribution of resources. 81 3 The promotion of reliance on the promises of . I understand and agree that if through no fault of my own I am disqualified for entrance into training for this AFSC, I may elect in writing to complete my enlistment in another AFSC for which qualified or be immediately discharged."
128 See, e.g., ATCM 33-2 supra note 2, para. 2-14(g)(3), which describes the Air Force's Guaranteed AFSC Program: "The Air Force guarantees job assignment prior to enlistment, formal technical training, and choice of initial duty assignment upon completion of training." Since the regulations expressly authorize recruiters to make such guarantees, their enforcement is not impeded by the actual authority doctrine. See note 64 supra. When recruiters make guarantees that are not authorized by the regulations, the problem can be viewed as one of misrepresentation. See text at notes 68-98 supra.
127 E.g., "You can now enlist in the Air Force and be guaranteed that you will have the job you want." Directorate of Advertising, USAF Recruiting Service, Additional Guaranteed Jobs in the United States Air Force 3 (1972) (emphasis in original). the government is similarly necessary: to the extent that the government depends on the voluntary action of its citizens, rather than compulsion, to carry out its functions, such as the raising of armies, citizens must be able to rely on the promises that the government has made to induce them to act. If conscription is abolished and if the voluntary action of citizens becomes the sole means of filling the ranks of the armed services, the need to enforce guarantees made to induce enlistment will be particularly great. Recent studies made for the Department of Defense indicate that such promises would be one of the primary inducements of enlistment in an all-volunteer armed force. 1 3 2
The existence of the draft complicates the problem, however, since a high percentage of enlistees in recent years have probably been motivated by a desire to avoid conscription. 183 But even under the bargain theory of consideration, the most stringent test that the courts employ to determine whether a promise is enforceable,' 1 3 4 voluntary enlistment constitutes sufficient consideration for the military's enlistment guarantee. 85 The emphasis given such guarantees in the armed forces' recruiting campaigns indicates that they are "bargained for and given in exchange" for voluntary enlistment, 3 6 and it can be Sess. 12,655-56, 12,658-701 (1970) . The bargain theory has been widely attacked on the ground that it identifies as contractual too narrow a range of promises, IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § § 193-96 (1963) , but it seems evident that those promises that it does identify should be treated as contracts. Moreover, this doctrine has been used to identify contractual promises of the government. E.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1983); Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 886 (1903) .
THE REPORT OF THE PRESEDENT'S CoMMIssIoN oN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER
185 Enlistment cannot be regarded as insufficient consideration on the ground that it is merely the performance of a preexisting legal duty. See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 175 (1963) . Despite the provisions of 50 U.S.C. App. § 454 (1970) , no legal duty to serve in the Armed Forces can be said to exist in any realistic sense until an induction order issues. See United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 862, 863 (9th Cir. 1972), which described the duty imposed by that statute as "a contingent obligation . . .which ripens into a fixed obligation . . . when the induction order issues." Contra, Note, 18 Am. U.L. REv. 596, 601 (1969) . More importantly, the obligations assumed by enlistment differ from those imposed by induction: the enlistee often assumes a term of service for three to six years, whereas the inductee must serve for only two years. Enlistments in the Navy, for example, are for four, five, or six years depending on the type of enlistment guarantee offered. NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art. assumed that the military would not offer a particular guarantee to an enlistee unless it was necessary to induce his enlistment.
7
A judicial remedy for breach of enlistment guarantees is necessary, in addition, because of the inadequacy of the administrative remedies presently available. With the exception of the Army, the armed services have not created specialized administrative machinery to deal with alleged branches of enlistment guarantees, and, even under the Army procedure, disputes are resolved by administrative personnel without formal proceedings. 38 While these procedures should be exhausted before judicial relief is sought, 189 it is questionable whether limiting the enlistee to them would satisfy the requirements of due process.1 40 2. The Utility of the Contract Concept. The proposition that specialized enlistment guarantees are a source of contractual rights does not mean that the entire relationship between the military and an enlistee in a special program becomes contractual simply because such guarantees are made. Rather, it suggests that the relationship should be viewed as governed partly by statute, partly by military rgulation, and partly by contract. This conceptualization of enlistment proves useful whether an enlistee fails to receive the guaranteed training and assignments because of administrative action, a change in regulations, or a discrepancy between regulations and the written terms of the guarantee.
a. Administrative Action. If enlistment were viewed as simply a status governed by statutes and regulations, judicial remedies for enlistees who fail to receive guaranteed training or assignments because of administrative action could be based on the duty of the armed forces to follow their own regulations. 14 ' But the regulations do not unequivocally require that an enlistee receive what he has been 137 The bargain theory is based on an assumption that if bargaining occurs, a party in a free bargaining position, such as the armed services, can protect its own interests. See Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 CoLux.
L. REv. 576, 598 (1969).
138 See AR 601-210, supra note 2, para. 5-4.2 (change no. 4, Sept. 17, 1969) . 139 Cf. United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270 , 1272 (N.D. In. 1969 ), an enlistment case in which the court dispensed with the exhaustion requirement because "it would be manifestly unfair once again to relegate petitioner to a perhaps non-existent administrative machinery."
140 If an enlistment guarantee is a contract, a military administrative procedure that deprives an enlistee of a promised benefit must conform to due process requirements. See note 152 infra.
141 See note 90 supra.
guaranteed,' and the resolution of disputes is left to the discretion of administrative personnel. 148 Any judicial relief must, therefore, be premised on contract principles. The contract concept suggests at least three forms of relief: discharge from the armed forces (rescission), enforcement of the guarantee (specific performance), and damages. The damages remedy would probably involve insuperable problems of valuation. 44 Discharge on a writ of habeas corpus 45 is, however, an effective and justifiable remedy if the guarantee cannot be kept and if it is assumed that the enlistee would not have entered the armed forces without it. Contrary to a recent suggestion, 146 such a remedy is not barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, 47 in which the Court refused to review military duty orders. If an enlistment guarantee constitutes a valid contract, Orloff's holding that discretionary military action is unreviewable' 48 is inapplicable, because administrative action ceases 142 E.g., Ak 601-210, supra note 2, para. 5-4.1 (change no. 4, Sept. 17, 1969): "Every effort will be made to scrupulously honor all promises made at the time of enlistment or reenlistment. Enlistment commitments will be met . . . by following established procedures for reporting and assigning individuals enlisted for an option . .. 143 See note 138 supra. 144 Fuller and Perdue's analysis of contract damages, Fuller & Perdue, supra note 130, at 66, suggests three measures of damages: the enlistee's expectation interest-the value of the promised benefit (such as computer training); the enlistee's reliance interest-the cost to the enlistee of his actual service in the military; and the enlistee's restitution interest-the value of the enlistee's actual service (which is already protected by the enlistee's statutory claim for pay and allowances, see note 118 supra). Measurement of the expectation interest involves placing an objective value on such promised benefits as assignment in Europe rather than in a combat zone; whereas measurement of the reliance interest requires both a determination of what portion of the enlistee's total cost is allocable to the contractual benefits (promised benefits) as opposed to the statutory benefits (pay and allowances), and a valuation of the enlistee's loss of liberty and forfeiture of constitutional rights. See notes 95-96 supra.
145 In Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 492 (1971) , the Supreme Court expressly left open the question "whether, if petitioner be right in contending that his contract of enlistment was breached, habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy." The basis for such relief is that retention in the armed forces in violation of the terms of an enlistment guarantee constitutes unlawful custody.
146 In United States ex rel. Lewis v. Laird, 337 F. Supp. 118, 120 (S.D. Ill. 1972), petitioner sought discharge from the Army Reserve on a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his enlistment contract had been breached. The court found no breach, but went on to say: "It seems doubtful that the extraordinary remedy sought would ever be available to obtain judicial review of an alleged breach by 148 In Orloff, the Court dismissed the petition of a psychiatrist conscripted under the Doctors Draft Act, who sought discharge on the ground that he had been assigned duties, not as a doctor, but as a medical laboratory technician. The Court held that the statute required only that Orloff be assigned to duties within "medical and allied specialist to be discretionary to the extent that it is governed by contract, as well as by statute or regulation. Specific enforcement of the guarantee, 149 the second possible remedy, would often have the same practical effect as discharge, because the statutes and regulations governing discharge provide that the armed forces may terminate an enlistment at any time for the convenience of the government. 1 0 Thus, if a court orders specific performance, the armed forces can discharge the enlistee rather than comply.
b. Changes in Regulations.
The principle that the armed services must follow their own regulations' 5 ' cannot serve as a basis for judicial relief when regulations are changed to conflict with an enlistment guarantee. If, however, the guarantee is regarded as a contract, it can be argued that under the fifth amendment due process clause a change in regulations cannot deprive an enlistee of his contractual rights. 152 In Winters v. United States,'r 3 the court considered at length the effect of a change in regulations on the provisions of an enlistment document. Since the case did not involve a special program guarantee, it is doubtful that the enlistment provision with which it dealt should be considered contractual; 15 but the court proceeded on the assumption that it was.
The plaintiff in Winters had enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve, at which time he signed a statement of understanding that required him to attend 90 percent of all drills scheduled in each year. A subsequent regulation increased the requirement to 100 percent of all categories": since Orloff had been assigned to duties within these general categories, his particular assignment was discretionary and unreviewable. See Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 254 n.11 (2d Cir. 1971); Glazier v. Hackel, 440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971 Because of the difficulties involved in balancing the needs of national defense against individual interest, the courts should not pay the same deference to military judgments, expressed in regulations, as they do to the judgment of Congress. The armed forces, as immediate parties to enlistment contracts, are less disinterested than Congress, 5 8 and the regulations promulgated by them are perhaps less thoroughly considered-at least as to their effects on individual enlistees-than legislation Congress has passed. 59 There may be situations in which the interests of national defense require that retroactive regulations be allowed to abrogate the terms of enlistment contracts. The courts should, however, carefully scrutinize any claim by the military that such a necessity exists. (1935) , the Court took a "stricter view" of congressional abrogation of federal government contracts than of private contracts because of "a feeling that it is more unfair to permit a party to a contract to modify its terms than for the legislature, as a disinterested body, to alter the rights created by a contract between private parties." Hochman, The Su- When his original four-year term of enlistment expired, the enlistee sought to be discharged on the ground that, since he had completed only one of the three schools specified in the document, his agreement to extend was not binding. The Navy, however, refused to discharge him because, contrary to the statement in the enlistment agreement, a Navy regulation provided that extensions of this sort become binding upon completion of only one school.
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The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit reversed, arguing that the Navy regulation was "automatically a part of the contract" because it had the force and effect of law and because "existing laws are read into contracts in order to fix the rights and obligations of the parties."' 6 3 This argument is simply another way of stating the conclusion that when statutes and regulations conflict with the terms of a contract, the statutes and regulations prevail. While this conclusions may often be sound with respect to conflicts between statutes and the terms of contracts between private parties, it is not justifiable with respect to a conflict between regulations promulgated by a military service and the terms of an agreement that the service has made. Since the service prescribes the contents of both the regulations and its agreements, it should have the responsibility for ensuring that the two do not conflict.
The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, was not necessarily based on these broad grounds. The court also held that the district court had erred in invoking the parol evidence rule and in refusing to admit the regulation in evidence to help in interpreting the enlistment agreement. The regulation indicates that, in fact, the enlistment agreement contained a typographical error: it should have read "IC, EM or MM Class 'A' Schools." An enlistee who had received counselling and information concerning the Nuclear Field Program would probably have been aware that he would attend only one of these schools. 1 64 Although the Ninth Circuit did not mention these facts, they suggest that its decision conforms to the adhesion contract principle that courts should read enlistment documents as they would reasonably be read by enlistees. Thus, if the Navy could establish that, in view of the information he had received concerning the Nuclear Field Program, it would have been unreasonable for Rehart to believe that he would attend all three schools, the provision in his extension agreement would not be given effect. 165 3. Breaches by the Enlistee. It is doubtful that the contract concept should be used to fashion a remedy for the armed services against enlistees in special programs who violate their enlistment agreements. In McCullough & Joy v. Seamans,1 66 the Air Force sought damages from an Air Force Academy graduate on the ground that, by obtaining a conscientious objector discharge, he had breached his agreement to remain in the service for five years in return for his free education. Although the cadet undoubtedly violated the provisions of the document he had signed, there is little basis for regarding that document as a contract since it merely paraphrased the governing statutes. 167 The court, however, placed its decision on broader grounds and, without 164 The regulation is discussed in Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Cal. 1971 . See also U.S. Recruiting Aids Division, (RAD) 69118, The Navy Nuclear Program 9-10 (April 1, 1969) . The schools are not successive schools in a single career field but are the initial schools in three different career fields.
165 Alternatively the problem could have been viewed as one of misrepresentation. See text at notes 68-98 supra. Since relief for misrepresentations to enlistees should not depend on the presence of an intent to mislead (which certainly was absent in Rehart), and since misrepresentations can be written as well as verbal, the primary inquiry would have been the same as under the contract of adhesion approach, that is, whether the enlistee relied on the typographical error. There is an express statutory requirement that cadets "sign an agreement ... to accept an appointment and serve as a commisioned officer of the Regular Air Force for at least five years," 10 U.S.C. § 9348(a)(2) (1970), but since there are statutory consequences for failing to fulfill the "agreement," 10 U.S.C.
§ 9348(b) (1970), the document should be regarded, not as a contract, but as a written consent which is necessary to render the statutory scheme operative.
discussing the document involved, simply held that a contractual remedy was an inappropriate solution to the problem. 68 Indeed, the opinion suggests that the armed forces probably should not be afforded a contractual remedy even when enlistees violate provisions that can be regarded as contractual. As the court argued, the contract concept is a clumsy device for fashioning a remedy' 6 9 and is unnecessary since the government, unlike the enlistee, can provide its own remedy by enacting statutes and regulations.
CONCLUSION
The contract concept is of limited usefulness in resolving disputes between enlistees and the armed forces. Enlistment can best be viewed, not as the making of a contract, but as an administrative procedure that results in a restriction of liberty and the loss of certain constitutional rights. Ordinarily that procedure establishes a relationship governed entirely by regulations, statutes, and constitutional requirements. It cannot usefully be conceptualized as contractual. When, however, specific guarantees are made to induce enlistment, it is possible to consider them as a kind of contract-a view that may facilitate their enforcement by the courts. To resolve disputes concerning such enlistment guarantees, the courts should look to adhesion contract or sui generis enlistment contract principles rather than to the rules of general contract theory. 168 The court argued that the problem was "far too involved for simple contract principles to settle," and that it warranted a congressional solution. 169 The court pointed out that "a suit for damages is hardly the medium for resolving the problem" and that a more effective remedy would be to require alternative civilian service, a remedy difficult to fashion through an application of contract principles. 5 S.S.L.R. at 3648. The damages remedy would also entail difficult problems of valuation. , in which, after allowing that remedy, the court added that it "offer[ed] no opinion as to what might be an appropriate measure of damages." Another contract remedy, specific performance of the agreement to serve in the armed forces, would be inappropriate in many situations in which it is desirable that the enlistee be discharged (such as when he has become disabled, or a conscientious objector). A third contract remedy, rescission, would be completely ineffective unless it were accompanied by an action for damages.
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